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Over a third of Americans believe that global warming is 
a hoax (Swift, 2013), and over half believe that Lee Har-
vey Oswald did not act alone in the assassination of John 
F. Kennedy ( Jensen, 2013). These are examples of con-
spiracy theories—explanations for important events that 
involve secret plots by powerful and malevolent groups 
(e.g., Goertzel, 1994). In recent years, there has been 
growing interest in the psychological factors that drive 
the popularity of conspiracy theories, and in this article, 
we draw together and organize findings from this bur-
geoning research. This research suggests that people may 
be drawn to conspiracy theories when—compared with 
nonconspiracy explanations—they promise to satisfy 
important social psychological motives that can be char-
acterized as epistemic (e.g., the desire for understanding, 
accuracy, and subjective certainty), existential (e.g., the 
desire for control and security), and social (e.g., the 
desire to maintain a positive image of the self or group). 
This taxonomy, derived from system-justification theory 
( Jost, Ledgerwood, & Hardin, 2008), serves as a useful 
heuristic to classify the motives associated with conspir-
acy belief. However, the comparatively scarce research 
examining the consequences of conspiracy theories does 
not indicate that they ultimately help people fulfill these 
motives.
Epistemic Motives
Finding causal explanations for events is a core part of 
building up a stable, accurate, and internally consistent 
understanding of the world (Heider, 1958). Specific epis-
temic motives that causal explanations may serve include 
slaking curiosity when information is unavailable, reduc-
ing uncertainty and bewilderment when available infor-
mation is conflicting, finding meaning when events seem 
random, and defending beliefs from disconfirmation. 
Relevant to these motives, conspiracy theories have attri-
butes that set them apart from other types of causal 
explanation. Albeit to varying degrees, they are specula-
tive in that they posit actions that are hidden from public 
scrutiny, complex in that they postulate the coordination 
of multiple actors, and resistant to falsification in that 
they postulate that conspirators use stealth and disinfor-
mation to cover up their actions—implying that people 
who try to debunk conspiracy theories may, themselves, 
be part of the conspiracy (Lewandowsky et al., 2015). 
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What psychological factors drive the popularity of conspiracy theories, which explain important events as secret plots 
by powerful and malevolent groups? What are the psychological consequences of adopting these theories? We review 
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A related property of conspiracy theories is that they can 
protect cherished beliefs (e.g., vaccination is harmful; 
climate change is not a serious concern) by casting over-
whelmingly disconfirmatory evidence (e.g., scientific 
findings) as the product of a conspiracy (Lewandowsky, 
Oberauer, & Gignac, 2013).
In general, empirically warranted (vs. speculative), 
parsimonious (vs. complex), and falsifiable explanations 
are stronger according to normative standards of causal 
explanation (e.g., in science; see Grimes, 2016). However, 
conspiracy theories appear to provide broad, internally 
consistent explanations that allow people to preserve 
beliefs in the face of uncertainty and contradiction. In 
keeping with this analysis, research suggests that belief 
in conspiracy theories is stronger when the motivation 
to find patterns in the environment is experimentally 
heightened (Whitson & Galinsky, 2008). It is also stronger 
among people who habitually seek meaning and patterns 
in the environment, including believers in paranormal 
phenomena (e.g., Bruder, Haffke, Neave, Nouripanah, & 
Imhoff, 2013; but see Dieguez, Wagner-Egger, & Gauvrit, 
2015). It also appears to be stronger when events are 
especially large in scale or significant and leave people 
dissatisfied with mundane, small-scale explanations 
(Leman & Cinnirella, 2013). Furthermore, the need for 
cognitive closure is associated with beliefs in salient con-
spiracy theories for events that lack clear official explana-
tions (Marchlewska, Cichocka, & Kossowska, 2017). Also, 
research suggests that conspiracy belief is stronger when 
people experience distress as a result of feeling uncertain 
(van Prooijen & Jostmann, 2013).
Our analysis suggests that conspiracy theories may 
satisfy some epistemic motives at the expense of oth-
ers—for example, by shielding beliefs from uncertainty 
while being less likely to be accurate. The epistemic 
drawbacks of conspiracy theories do not seem to be 
readily apparent to people who lack the ability or moti-
vation to think critically and rationally. Conspiracy 
belief is correlated with lower levels of analytic thinking 
(Swami, Voracek, Stieger, Tran, & Furnham, 2014) and 
lower levels of education (Douglas, Sutton, Callan, 
Dawtry, & Harvey, 2016). It is also associated with the 
tendency to overestimate the likelihood of co-occurring 
events (Brotherton & French, 2014) and the tendency 
to perceive agency and intentionality where it does not 
exist (Douglas et al., 2016).
In light of their objective or normative limitations, 
how well do conspiracy theories satisfy the epistemic 
motives that draw people to them? Relatively little 
research has addressed this question, and it suggests that 
they may be more appealing than satisfying. On one 
hand, extreme and entrenched attitude positions are 
associated with conspiracy beliefs, suggesting that they 
may help people defend beliefs from disconfirmation 
(Uscinski, Klofstad, & Atkinson, 2016). In contrast, recent 
experiments indicate that presenting people with per-
suasive cases for conspiracy theories about vaccination 
( Jolley & Douglas, 2014a) and climate change ( Jolley & 
Douglas, 2014b) increases their levels of uncertainty.
Existential Motives
As well as their purely epistemic purposes, causal 
explanations serve the need for people to feel safe and 
secure in their environment and to exert control over 
the environment as autonomous individuals and as 
members of collectives (Tetlock, 2002). Several early 
theories of conspiracy belief suggested that people turn 
to conspiracy theories for compensatory satisfaction 
when these needs are threatened. For example, people 
who lack instrumental control may be afforded some 
compensatory sense of control by conspiracy theories, 
because they offer them the opportunity to reject offi-
cial narratives and feel that they possess an alternative 
account (Goertzel, 1994). Conspiracy theories may 
promise to make people feel safer as a form of cheater 
detection, in which dangerous and untrustworthy indi-
viduals are recognized and the threat they posed is 
reduced or neutralized (Bost & Prunier, 2013).
Research supports this account of the motivation 
behind conspiracy belief. Studies have shown that peo-
ple are likely to turn to conspiracy theories when they 
are anxious (Grzesiak-Feldman, 2013) and feel power-
less (Abalakina-Paap, Stephan, Craig, & Gregory, 1999). 
Other research indicates that conspiracy belief is strongly 
related to lack of sociopolitical control or lack of psy-
chological empowerment (Bruder et al., 2013). Experi-
ments have shown that compared with baseline conditions, 
conspiracy belief is heightened when people feel unable 
to control outcomes and is reduced when their sense of 
control is affirmed (van Prooijen & Acker, 2015).
Unfortunately, research conducted thus far does not 
indicate that conspiracy belief effectively satisfies this 
motivation. On the contrary, experimental exposure to 
conspiracy theories appears to immediately suppress 
people’s sense of autonomy and control (Douglas & 
Leite, 2017; Jolley & Douglas, 2014a, 2014b). These 
same studies have also shown that it makes people less 
inclined to take actions that, in the long run, might 
boost their autonomy and control. Specifically, they are 
less inclined to commit to their organizations and to 
engage in mainstream political processes such as voting 
and party politics. Furthermore, exposure to conspiracy 
theories may subtly undermine people’s autonomy in 
another way. Douglas and Sutton (2008) showed that 
people were effectively persuaded by proconspiracy 
material but were not aware that they had been per-
suaded and falsely recalled that their preexposure 
beliefs were identical to their new beliefs. Since con-
spiracy theories suggest that important outcomes are 
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in the hands of malevolent forces who possess and 
exercise powers beyond legitimate limits, it would not 
be surprising if further research suggests that their 
effect is often disempowering.
Social Motives
Causal explanations, conspiracy explanations included, 
are also informed by various social motivations, includ-
ing the desire to belong and to maintain a positive 
image of the self and the in-group. Scholars have sug-
gested that conspiracy theories valorize the self and the 
in-group by allowing blame for negative outcomes to be 
attributed to others. Thus, they may help to uphold the 
image of the self and the in-group as competent and 
moral but as sabotaged by powerful and unscrupulous 
others. If this is the case, we can expect conspiracy theo-
ries to be particularly appealing to people who find the 
positive image of their self or in-group to be threatened 
(Cichocka, Marchlewska, & Golec de Zavala, 2016).
Research generally supports this expectation. Experi-
mental results suggest that experiences of ostracism 
cause people to believe in superstitions and conspiracy 
theories, apparently as part of an effort to make sense 
of their experience (Graeupner & Coman, 2017). Mem-
bers of groups who have objectively low (vs. high) 
status because of their ethnicity (Crocker, Luhtanen, 
Broadnax, & Blaine, 1999) or income (Uscinski & Parent, 
2014) are more likely to endorse conspiracy theories. 
People on the losing (vs. winning) side of political pro-
cesses also appear more likely to believe conspiracy 
theories (Uscinski & Parent, 2014). Conspiracy belief has 
also been linked to prejudice against powerful groups 
(Imhoff & Bruder, 2014) and those perceived as enemies 
(Kofta & Sedek, 2005).
These findings suggest that conspiracy theories may 
be recruited defensively, to relieve the self or in-group 
from a sense of culpability for their disadvantaged posi-
tion. In keeping with this defensive motivation, con-
spiracy belief is associated with narcissism—an inflated 
view of oneself that requires external validation and is 
linked to paranoid ideation (Cichocka, Marchlewska, & 
Golec de Zavala, 2016). Conspiracy belief is also pre-
dicted by collective narcissism—a belief in the in-group’s 
greatness paired with a belief that other people do not 
appreciate it enough (Cichocka, Marchlewska, Golec de 
Zavala, & Olechowski, 2016). Groups who feel that they 
have been victimized are more likely to endorse con-
spiracy theories about powerful out-groups (Bilewicz, 
Winiewski, Kofta, & Wójcik, 2013).
Although people are clearly attracted to conspiracy 
theories when their social motivations are frustrated, it 
is not at all clear that adopting these theories is a fruitful 
way to fulfill these motivations. A feature of conspiracy 
theories is their negative, distrustful representation of 
other people and groups. Thus, it is plausible that they 
are not only a symptom but also a cause of the feelings 
of alienation and anomie—a feeling of personal unrest 
and lack of understanding of the social world—with 
which they are correlated (e.g., Abalakina-Paap et al., 
1999). Experiments show that exposure to conspiracy 
theories decreases trust in governmental institutions, 
even if the conspiracy theories are unrelated to those 
institutions (Einstein & Glick, 2015). It also causes dis-
enchantment with politicians and scientists ( Jolley & 
Douglas, 2014a). So far, therefore, empirical research 
suggests that conspiracy theories serve to erode social 
capital and may, if anything, frustrate people’s need to 
see themselves as valuable members of morally decent 
collectives.
Summary, Caveats, and Future 
Research
Research thus far has successfully articulated some of 
the motivations that, together with deficiencies in avail-
able information, cognitive ability, and motivation to 
think critically, may contribute to conspiracy belief. 
Although scholars have theorized about the conse-
quences of conspiracy beliefs for their adherents and the 
community, relatively little empirical research has been 
done to explore them. Nevertheless, preliminary work 
suggests that despite the allure of conspiracy beliefs for 
people who have heightened epistemic, existential, and 
social motives, they may ultimately thwart those motives 
further. In this sense, conspiracy theories might be seen 
as an ironic or self-defeating manifestation of motivated 
social cognition. There are grounds to expect further 
research to corroborate this preliminary picture since, as 
we have seen, conspiracy theories have some attributes 
that do not lend themselves to the fulfillment of these 
motives—for example, they are generally speculative and 
contrarian, represent the public as ignorant and at the 
mercy of unaccountable powers, and impute highly anti-
social and cynical motives to other individuals.
Nonetheless, there are also grounds to expect future 
research to show that conspiracy theories fulfill the 
needs of some people. The experimental research con-
ducted thus far has sampled from populations (under-
graduate students and survey panelists) that are not 
particularly disadvantaged or threatened and that gen-
erally do not endorse conspiracy theories. For these 
people, conspiracy theories are likely to be experienced 
as unsettling, destabilizing, and potentially alienating. 
However, these people are not whom scholars have 
had in mind when they have argued that conspiracy 
theories may sometimes be adaptive. They include 
groups and individuals who are already alienated from 
society and for whom conspiracy theories may offer 
some compensation. These include disempowered 
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groups who may use conspiracy theories to subvert 
dominance hierarchies by formulating their own under-
standing of realities (Sapountzis & Condor, 2013) and 
by fostering solidarity and collective action (Adams, 
O’Brien, & Nelson, 2006). In these communities, and 
indeed in online communities in which conspiracy 
theories represent normative or even official positions 
(e.g., the 9/11 Truth movement), conspiracy belief may 
offer an important source of belonging and shared real-
ity. Furthermore, history has repeatedly shown that 
corporate and political elites do conspire against public 
interests. Conspiracy theories play an important role in 
bringing their misdeeds into the light.
To conduct fair tests of the utility of conspiracy belief, 
controlled longitudinal and experimental investigations 
of disadvantaged and threatened populations are 
needed. In particular, future research needs to examine 
individuals whose psychological needs are chronically 
or experimentally threatened and determine whether 
conspiracy belief moves them closer to or further away 
from the fulfillment of these needs. In one such design, 
Jolley, Douglas, and Sutton (2017) exposed people to 
threats to the legitimacy of their social system. They 
found that the deleterious effects of these threats on 
satisfaction with the status quo were eliminated when 
participants were also exposed to conspiracy theories. 
Conspiracy theories therefore appeared to buffer people 
from the effects of threats to the status quo.
Conclusion
We have reviewed the current literature on the psycho-
logical factors that appear to drive conspiracy belief. 
We conclude that conspiracy belief appears to stem to 
a large extent from epistemic, existential, and social 
motives. Research has yet to demonstrate that it effec-
tively serves those motivations, and early indications 
are that it may often thwart them. It is possible, there-
fore, that conspiracy belief is a self-defeating form of 
motivated social cognition. However, important ques-
tions remain open, and more controlled research on 
the consequences of conspiracy beliefs is needed, par-
ticularly on the vulnerable and disadvantaged popula-
tions that have been identified as most likely to benefit 
from them. We hope that this review will serve as an 
organizing schema for future research on the psychol-
ogy of conspiracy belief.
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